By  C.  Snouck  Hurgronje 

The  Holy  War,  Made  in  Germany 

Mohammedanism 

The  Revolt  in  Arabia 


The 
Revolt   in   Arabia 


By 

Dr.  C.  Snouck  Hurgronje 

Professor  of   the  Arabie  Language  in  the   University  of 

Leiden;  Councillor  to  the  Dutch  Ministry 

of  the  Colonies,  ete. 


With  a  Foreword  by 
Richard  J.  H.  Gottheil 

Columbia  University,  New  York 


G,  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and  London 

Zbe   fmfcfter&ocfter    press 

1917 


±       A« 


Copyright,  191 7 

BY 

C  SNOUCK  HURGRONJE 


TJbc  ftntcRcrbocfcer  prcso,  *Rcw  Borfc 


FOREWORD 

A  LL  those  interested  in  Mohammedan 
affairs  were  much  surprised  to  learn, 
through  a  despatch  from  Cairo  on  June 
22,  1916,  that  the  Emir  of  Mecca  had  re- 
volted from  Turkish  overlordship.  Much 
speculation  was  indulged  in  regarding 
the  causes  for  such  an  uprising  and  its 
probable  or  possible  outcome;  for  there 
are  few  parts  of  the  habitable  globe  about 
which  the  ordinary  student  of  inter- 
national affairs  knows  so  little  as  he  does 
about  Arabia.  Life  there  has  remained  in 
much  of  its  mediaeval  primitiveness; 
and  even  scholars  who  are  specially 
concerned  about  Mohammedanism,  and 
about  the  several  hundred  millions  of  its 

devotees,    are   little   better    situated    in 

in 


35934 


» > 


iv  Foreword 

receiving  accurate  information   of  that 
which  is  occurring  in  the  "Holy  Land" 
of  Arabia. 

No  one  living  knows  its  history  better 
than  does  Professor  Snouck  Hurgronje 
of  the  University  of  Leiden.  To  his  vast 
knowledge  upon  all  subjects  connected 
with  Mohammedanism  and  gained  from 
an  extensive  reading  of  its  literature,  he 
has  added  personal  observation  during 
the  year  that  he  spent  in  Mecca  and 
Jiddah.  He  has  been  able  to  get  an  in- 
sight into  the  various  questions  involved 
in  its  tangled  history  at  the  present  day, 
and  to  learn  at  first  hand  of  the  parties 
which  are  rivals  for  leadership  there.  In 
the  Dutch  newspaper  Nieuwe  Rotter- 
damsche  Courant,  July  14,  191 6,  Professor 
Snouck  Hurgronje  gave  a  lucid  expla- 
nation of  the  situation  created  as  he  saw 
it,  by  the  proclamation  of  the  Emir. 
The  following  pages  contain  a  translation 


Foreword  v 

of  these  articles.  I  have  added,  as  an 
appendix,  the  official  proclamation  of  the 
Shereef  to  the  whole  Moslem  world  as  it 
appeared  translated  into  English  in  The 
Near  East  for  August  25,  19 16. 

Since  these  articles  were  published  in 
Holland  we  have  heard  very  little  as  to 
what  is  happening  in  and  around  Mecca. 
News  has  come  that  an  attempt  at  admin- 
istrative reconstruction  has  been  made  at 
Jiddah;  that  the  new  Shereef  has  appoint- 
ed a  special  agent  at  Cairo  in  the  person 
of  Omar  Bey  al-Faruki;  and  that  the 
new  government  has  decided  to  publish 
a  weekly  paper  called  Elkiblah,  which  is 
to  be  edited  by  Fuad  Effendi  Khatib 
of  Gordon  College,  Assuan.  What  is  of 
greater  importance  is  the  alleged  assist- 
ance offered  to  the  Emir  Husain  by  the 
Emir  Abd  al-Aziz  ibn  Sa'ud,  the  head  of 
the  Wahhabites  in  the  Nejd — the  district 
east  of  Medinah — and  by  the  Zaidite  Im- 


vi  Foreword 

am  Yahyah  in  the  Yemen   against   the 
Turkish  troops  stationed  there. 

Richard  Gottheil. 

Dec.  23,  1916. 

Columbia  University. 


CONTENTS 

PACE 

Foreword iii 

I 

The  Shereefate  of  Mecca  .        .        i 

II 

The  Shereefate  of  Mecca  (Continued)       16 

III 
Shereef  and  Caliph    ....      29 

Note 41 

APPENDIX 

Proclamation  of  the  Shereef  of  Mecca    43 


Vll 


THE   REVOLT  IN  ARABIA 


THE   SHEREEFATE   OF   MECCA 

HOW  the  public  insists  upon  making 
a  snap  judgment  on  the  signifi- 
cance of  passing  events  is  shown  by  the 
haste  with  which  speculations  are  given 
out,  speculations  that  are  purely  hypo- 
thetical because  the  truth  of  the  reports 
that  reach  us  can,  as  yet,  be  verified 
only  approximately. 

According  to  a  Reuter  despatch,  the 
Great  Shereef  of  Mecca  has  revolted 
against  Turkish  authority  and,  at  the 
head  of  his  Arabs,  has  succeeded  in  forc- 
ing the  capitulation  of  the  garrisons  of 


2  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

Mecca,  Jidda,  Ta*  if,  and  Medina,  and 
has  seriously  hampered  the  movements 
of  Turkish  troops,  menacing  to  him,  by 
the  destruction  of  a  section  of  the  railroad 
from  Medina  to  the  north.  Wolff's 
Bureau,  on  the  other  hand,  spreads  a 
report  of  the  "Milli  Agency" — the  Turk- 
ish National  Agency — that  a  troop  of 
Arabs,  to  whom  robbery  was  no  unac- 
customed calling,  had  been  persuaded  by 
their  captain,  he  being  instigated  by 
English  marines,  to  bombard  Mecca, 
that  the  Turkish  troops  had,  however, 
speedily  restored  order,  and  that  the 
raiders  themselves,  when  it  was  proven 
that  their  leader  had  been  seduced  by 
English  money  to  act  thus  basely,  had 
delivered  the  miscreant  to  the  Turkish 
authorities. 

If  the  German-Turkish  statement  be 
correct,  the  occurrence  was  insignificant 
and  not  deserving  attention.     If  Reuter 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  3 

be  right  in  the  main  point,  then  it  is  well 
worth  while  to  consider  what  may  be 
the  possible  consequences  of  the  Arab 
movement. 

In  either  case,  to  comprehend  the  mat- 
ter rightly,  the  political  significance  of 
the  Shereefate  of  Mecca  should  be  under- 
stood and  the  reading  public  should  have 
a  clearer  idea  of  what  the  title  "Grand 
Shereef  of  Mecca' '  covers  than  is  pos- 
sessed by  the  majority. 

Mecca,  the  birth-place  of  the  Prophet 
Mohammed,  was  not  the  centre  from 
which  he  extended  his  sovereignty  over  a 
great  part  of  Arabia.  The  capital  of  the 
realm  founded  by  him  was  Medina,  situ- 
ated a  ten-day  caravan  journey  to  the 
north.  Moreover,  when,  about  twenty 
years  after  his  first  appearance  as  Allah's 
messenger,  Mohammed  conquered  Mecca, 
he  did  not  think  of  transferring  the  seat 
of  government  thither.     He  had  his  own 


4  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

good  reasons  for  this,  which  we  can  pass 
over  here.  Still  weightier  were  the  rea- 
sons that  influenced  his  successors  in  the 
administration  of  the  theocracy  of  Islam 
from  such  a  step.  Mecca  was  far  too 
remote  from  the  then  existing  centres  of 
civilisation  to  be  a  convenient  vantage 
point  for  the  world  conquest  considered 
by  Islam  as  its  appointed  task,  and  as  a 
capital  from  which  to  administer  the 
empire  which  the  first  Caliphs  were  able 
to  establish  by  force  of  arms.  Even 
Medina  seemed  unsuited  for  the  purpose, 
permanently.  Then,  when  the  Persian 
Empire,  Syria,  Egypt,  North  Africa,  and 
Spain  were  subjected  to  Islam,  Arabia,  re- 
garded politically,  became  a  remote  terri- 
tory with  a  steadily  decreasing  significance. 
The  residence  of  the  Caliphs  was  re- 
moved first  to  Damascus,  later  to  Bagdad, 
where  they  remained  established  for  five 
centuries — down  to  1250  a.d. 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  5 

Still  the  Arabian  peninsula,  arid  though 
it  is  in  the  main,  retained  its  prestige  in 
the  Moslem  world,  not  only  as  the  father- 
land of  the  conquerors,  but  also  as  the 
Holy  Land  of  Islam.  Mecca  might  be 
ill  adapted  for  a  political  capital,  but 
it  was,  in  the  eyes  of  the  faithful,  the 
earth's  centre,  where  the  first  human 
pair  had  walked,  where  Abraham  had 
founded  the  first  House  of  God,  the  Kaba, 
where  every  normal  Mohammedan  was 
bound  to  go  once  in  his  life  to  take  part 
in  the  religious  festival  annually  cele- 
brated there. 

While  Mecca  had  already  long  been  a 
religious  centre  for  the  heathen  Arabians, 
after  Mohammed's  death  Medina  was 
classed  with  it  as  a  spot  where  the  foun- 
dations of  Moslem  theocracy  were  laid, 
where  the  Prophet  had  built  his  first 
mosque,  and  where  he  was  buried.  The 
lieutenants  of  the  Caliphs  in  West  Arabia 


6  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

(the  Hijaz),  with  Medina  as  the  first, 
Mecca  as  the  second,  capital,  thus  had  the 
chief  sanctuaries  of  Islam  entrusted  to 
their  care,  and  they  were  bound  to  provide 
for  the  preservation  of  order  at  the 
enormous  international  gatherings  for 
which  the  two  holy  cities  had  furnished 
a  stage  every  year  since  Mohammed's 
death. 

Truly,  the  task  was  no  easy  one.  The 
inhabitants  of  Mecca  and  Medina  were, 
usually,  at  odds,  and  unanimous  only  in 
obstinacy  and  insubordination.  The 
nomads  of  the  intervening  district  con- 
tinued to  be,  under  Islam,  the  anarchists 
that  they  had  been  from  time  immemorial. 
Only  a  very  strong  hand  could  bridle  the 
disorders  native  to  the  Holy  Land.  And 
a  strong  hand  had  always  been  lacking. 

Very  soon  after  its  rise,  the  great  empire 
of  Islam  fell  asunder  and  the  continuous 
contests  between  the  state  and  statelets 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  7 

into  which  it  dissolved  made  the  central 
authority  of  the  Caliph  a  mere  fiction, 
incapable  of  efficient  exercise  of  power. 
Even  the  states,  prominent  from  their 
position  and  thus  better  situated  to 
maintain  order  in  the  Holy  Land,  as  it 
was  their  interest  to  do,  could  not  spare 
the  military  force  essential  for  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  Hijaz  (West  Arabia).  Thus 
the  holiest,  the  least  productive,  and  most 
difficult-to-rule  portion  of  the  Moslem 
Empire  was  practically  given  over  to 
confusion  as  its  natural  vital  element, 
and  the  more  vigorous  Mohammedan 
countries  limited  themselves  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  pilgrim  caravans  which 
set  out  from  their  realms  for  Arabia,  and 
of  such  of  their  own  subjects  as  had 
settled  there. 

Out  of  the  chaos  in  West  Arabia,  re- 
sulting from  the  disintegration  of  the 
Islamic  Empire,  was  born  the  Shereefate 


8  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

of  Mecca.  From  the  extraordinarily  nu- 
merous posterity  of  Mohammed,  issue 
of  the  union  of  his  daughter  Fatima  with 
his  nephew  AH,  many  remained  settled 
in  Arabia  as  owners  of  date  gardens,  as 
robber  knights  at  the  head  of  Bedouin 
clans,  or  as  speculators  in  the  gradually 
increasing  superstitious  adoration  of  the 
Mohammedans  for  the  Prophet's  blood. 
Outside  of  Arabia,  the  descendants  of  AH 
participated  in  political  revolutions  on 
greater  or  lesser  scale,  or  had  their  hands 
filled  by  the  governors  of  the  Moslem 
lands.  Their  short-sighted  avarice  and 
their  common  lack  of  political  talent, 
however,  hindered  them  from  carrying 
any  important  project  to  completion. 
Any  success  which  they  achieved  was 
always  transient.  The  universal  con- 
dition of  things  in  Arabia  afforded  the 
opportunity  of  turning  a  portion  of  the 
Holy  Province  into  a  personal  domain. 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  9 

In  about  1000  A.D.,  the  heads  of  certain 
families  among  the  descendants  of  AH 
began  to  make  themselves  powerful  in 
the  Hijaz  and  held  their  ground. 
From  1200  a.d.  to  the  present  time,  one 
line  of  these  children  of  Ali,  that  of 
Katada,  has  succeeded  in  maintaining 
supremacy  in  Mecca. 

The  names  sharif — anglicized  as  shereef 
— that  is  "The  Noble,"  and  sayyid  signi- 
fying "Seigneur"  or  "Lord,"  have  be- 
come, little  by  little,  titles  of  nobility 
throughout  the  entire  Mohammedan 
world,  especially  among  the  posterity  of 
the  Prophet.  The  head  of  the  reigning 
family  in  Mecca  is  "The  Shereef  of 
Mecca"  par  excellence,  and  the  people 
call  him  Sayyidana,  that  is  "Our  Master" 
(or  Our  Lord).  How  far  the  realm  of 
these  Shereef  s  was  extended  beyond  Mecca 
depended,  as  long  as  the  petty  dynasties 
existed,    entirely    on    the    chances    of 


io  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

circumstance;  the  more  that  confusion 
reigned  in  the  surrounding  Mohammedan 
realms  and  the  greater  the  energy  mani- 
fested by  the  ruling  head  of  the  family, 
the  greater  the  portion  of  the  Hijaz  that 
came  under  his  authority.  The  reverse 
was  equally  true.  The  defects  of  the 
most  respected  race  of  Islam  were,  to  a 
great  extent,  the  peculiar  characteristics 
of  the  Mecca  branch.  They  were  in- 
capable of  carrying  out  any  great  under- 
taking. 

The  pilgrims,  except  when  escorted 
by  an  imposing  military  force,  were  piti- 
lessly stripped  of  their  every  possession 
by  the  Shereef  and  his  satellites.  Like 
the  Bedouins  through  whose  territory 
the  hajjis  or  pilgrims  had  to  pass,  who 
counted  all  money  and  property  as 
God -given  booty,  the  Shereef s  con- 
sidered themselves  justified  in  making 
Allah's  guests  at  Mecca  submit  to  every 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  n 

kind  of  bleeding,  and  the  latter  had  no 
remedy. 

Further,  there  were  among  the  members 
of  the  noble  race  one  quarrel  after  another 
about  their  heritage,  so  that  it  was  almost 
the  normal  state  of  affairs  for  one  head 
of  two  rival  branches  of  the  family  to  fill 
the  Shereefate  while  the  other  besieged 
Mecca  or  rendered  the  roads  thither 
unsafe.  The  stable  population  of  Mecca 
were  sacrificed  to  this  struggle  for  mastery; 
the  blessings  of  peace  were  an  unknown 
luxury  to  them. 

When  the  Hijaz  was  still  actually 
governed  from  the  political  centre  of 
Islam,  Medina  was  the  appointed  capital. 
For  an  independent  local  principality, 
such  as  the  Shereefate,  Mecca  had  the 
advantage  of  not  being  so  accessible  to 
the  military  forces  of  powers  that  might 
trouble  themselves  about  the  Hijaz. 
Only  occasionally  could  the  Shereefs  of 


12  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

Mecca  control  Medina  at  the  same  time, 
as  the  intervening  distance  was  too  great 
for  the  transportation  facilities  of  the 
country.  The  alpine  city  Ta'if,  two  or 
three  days'  journey  east  of  Mecca,  where 
many  people  from  Mecca  resorted  for 
the  summer,  and  the  port  Jidda,  one 
to  two  days'  journey  to  the  west,  ordi- 
narily fell  under  the  Shereef.  Several 
smaller  ports  were  also  included  under 
his  rule.  The  connection  with  the  inte- 
rior, mainly  inhabited  by  nomadic  tribes, 
varied  according  to  the  personal  relations 
of  the  Shereef  with  the  head  of  the  Be- 
douin clan. 

The  Shereefate  of  Mecca  differed  from 
most  of  the  states  and  principalities  into 
which  the  great  Islam  Empire  was  divided, 
because  it  had  not  been  developed  gradu- 
ally from  a  governorship  to  a  condition  of 
greater  independence,  but  was  born,  spon- 
taneously, dining  a  period  of  confusion. 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  13 

At  Bagdad,  as  well  as  in  other  neigh- 
bouring capitals,  people  had  accepted  the 
change  as  a,  fait  accompli.  The  Shereefate 
was  neither  expressly  recognised  nor 
expressly  objected  to  as  unlawful.  Its 
century-long  existence  attained,  moreover, 
a  sort  of  virtual  legitimacy  through  its 
acceptance  by  many  Moslem  tribes,  who 
were  represented  in  the  Holy  City  by 
the  annual  deputations  of  pilgrims. 
These  visitors  were  constantly  exposed 
to  ill  treatment  on  the  part  of  the 
Shereef.  Yet,  in  spite  of  that,  they 
held  to  a  belief  that  domination  over 
the  Holy  City  belonged  rightfully  to 
a  branch  of  the  Holy  Family.  The 
fact  was  simply  accepted  as  irrefut- 
able. 

The  chief  Islam  powers  have  always 
attached  a  certain  reservation  to  their 
tacit  recognition  of  the  Shereefs  of  Mecca 
which  the  latter  have  found  themselves 


14  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

forced  to  accept.  He  was  never  an  inde- 
pendent ruler  and,  in  the  long  run,  had 
to  recognise  the  suzerainty  of  the  protect- 
ing states. 


II 

the  shereefate  of  mecca — Continued 

I T  was  to  these  accidents  of  origin  that 

the  Shereefate  of    Mecca  owed    its 

peculiar  standing.     Its  status  was  not  a 

little  enhanced  by  the  unique  significance 

of  the  city  of  Mecca  for  the  Mohammedan 

world  at  large.    From  the  tenth  century, 

no   one   of   the  foremost   Islam  princes 

possessed  the  machinery  to  keep  West 

Arabia    under    an    administration    even 

approximately  orderly.     On  two  points 

they  were  alike  determined — first,  to  have 

their  names  introduced  into  the  official 

prayers    at    the    official    ceremonies    of 

Mecca,  each  desiring  to  take  precedence 

of  the  others;  second,  that  their  deputies 

at  the  annual  festivals  should  take  rank 

15 


1 6  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

in  accordance  with  their  pretensions.  In 
the  prayers,  the  name  of  the  Caliph  was 
given  first  place,  without  question,  even 
after  his  power  had  become  a  phantom. 
The  descendants  of  the  Prophet,  wielding 
authority  at  Mecca  from  about  the  year 
iooo  to  1 200  A.D.,  managed  the  required 
homage  with  a  certain  impartiality.  At 
their  command,  there  were  prayers,  now 
for  the  official  Caliph  at  Bagdad  and 
again  for  the  heretical  opposition  Caliph 
in  Egypt,  according  to  the  puissance 
manifested  or  the  bribes  offered  by  the 
one  or  the  other.  The  Shereef  family, 
ruling  at  Mecca  from  about  1200  a.d.  to 
the  present  time,  were  soon  freed  from 
the  difficulty  of  choice  when  an  end  was 
made  of  the  Fatimide  Caliphate  in  Egypt 
and  when  the  Mongol  storm  swept  away 
that  of  Bagdad  in  1258.  In  the  centuries 
following  these  events,  the  Sultans  alone 
were  mentioned  in  the  prayers.     And  it 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  17 

was  thus,  in  the  prayers,  that  there  was 
the  first  formal  expression  of  the  relation 
between  the  Shereefate  and  the  chief 
power  of  Islam. 

Egypt  long  held  an  uncontested  posi- 
tion so  that  it  is  correct  to  speak  of  a  pro- 
tectorate exercised  by  her  Sultans  over 
the  territory  of  West  Arabia  from  the 
thirteenth  to  the  sixteenth  centuries. 
The  Hijaz  (West  Arabia)  was  dependent 
on  the  Nile-land  for  the  importation  of 
foodstuffs  and  other  necessities.  The 
Mameluke  Sultans  permitted  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Shereefate  and  did  not 
interfere  in  the  endless  petty  wars  of 
succession  fought  by  the  claimants  to 
the  office.  When  it  became  necessary, 
it  cost  the  Sultans  little  exertion  to  turn 
the  scale  in  some  of  these  contests  with 
the  help  of  a  detachment  of  regular 
troops,  and  to  enforce  obedience.  It 
was  always  an  unequal  strife  between 


1 8  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

the  trained  soldiers  of  a  great  Moslem 
power  and  the  Shereefs  little  force,  con- 
sisting as  it  did,  of  a  few  hundred  slaves, 
the  same  number  of  mercenaries,  and 
the  timely  aid  of  a  few  Bedouin  clans. 
Domestic  dissension,  moreover,  always 
assured  the  punitory  leader  of  the  coope- 
ration of  one  party  within  the  disturbed 
territory. 

When  Egypt  was  conquered  in  151 7 
by  Sultan  Selim,  Turkey,  automatically, 
took  over  the  protectorate  of  the  Holy 
Land.  The  Turkish  Sultans  styled  them- 
selves, with  unassuming  pride,  "the  serv- 
ants' '  of  both  holy  cities.  At  the  same 
time,  their  garrison  in  Mecca  was  an 
outward  and  visible  sign  that  they  did  not 
intend  to  share  the  service  with  anyone. 
From  that  epoch  on,  their  names  im- 
mediately preceded  that  of  the  Grand 
Shereef  in  the  official  prayers.  Later, 
the  significance  of   the  honour  was  en- 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  19 

hanced  by  the  addition  of  the  title  of 
Caliph  assumed  by  the  Turkish  Sultans 
as  sign  and  seal  of  their  unrivalled  power 
in  Islam. 

The  Osmans  made  as  little  effort  to  re- 
form the  hopelessly  muddled  administra- 
tion of  the  holy  cities  as  their  predecessors 
in  the  Protectorate  had  done.  By  that 
date,  the  Shereefate  had  obtained  for 
more  than  three  centuries,  and  no  Mo- 
hammedan thought  of  questioning  either 
the  legality  or  the  desirability  of  the 
institution. 

The  administration  methods  of  the 
Osmans  were  as  little  adapted  for  per- 
manent centralization  as  those  of  the 
earlier  Mohammedan  empire  had  been. 
The  provinces  speedily  assumed  the  char- 
acter of  feudal  holdings,  each  possessing 
a  large  measure  of  independence.  The 
Pashas  of  Cairo,  of  Damascus,  of  Bagdad, 
vied  with  each  other  for  the  first  rank 


20  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

at  Mecca.  From  this  rivalry  the  Sher- 
eefate  profited,  just  as  the  suzerains  of 
the  Holy  Land  had  reaped  advantage 
from  the  family  disputes  of  the  Shereefs. 
In  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Shereefs 
were  not  troubled  by  the  pressure  of  a 
heavy  hand  from  without,  but  they  were 
forced  to  depend  on  themselves,  and  their 
inadequate  equipment  was  a  source  of 
danger  to  them  when  an  unexpected  op- 
ponent threatened  to  destroy  their  power. 
The  Wahhabis  of  Central  Arabia,  roused 
by  a  puritanic  zeal  to  protest  against 
what  they  declared  was  the  dishonour  of 
Islam,  launched  out  on  a  campaign  of 
reform.  This  "holy  war,"  directed,  pri- 
marily, against  the  Turkish  domination, 
succeeded  in  exciting  a  religious  fervour 
throughout  a  great  part  of  Arabia, 
similar  to  that  awakened  by  Mohammed 
twelve  centuries  earlier,  and,  at  the  turn 
of   the   eighteenth   into   the   nineteenth 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  21 

centuries,  these  Wahhabis  succeeded  in 
obtaining  the  mastery  of  the  Holy  Cities 
and  in  forcing  the  Shereefs  to  recognise 
their  authority.  With  infinite  difficulty 
the  Pasha  of  Egypt,  Mohammed  Ali, 
later  the  first  Khedive,  succeeded  in  ful- 
filling the  mission  entrusted  to  him  by 
the  Sultan  of  Turkey  and  in  reconquering 
the  Holy  Land  in  his  turn. 

The  then  Shereef  was  punished  for  his 
inefficiency  in  repelling  the  Wahhabis 
from  his  realm,  by  banishment,  together 
with  several  members  of  his  family,  while 
the  head  of  another  branch  of  his  kinsfolk 
was  appointed  to  his  vacated  post.  At 
this  crisis,  too,  there  was  no  talk  of 
abolition  of  the  Shereefate. 

With  the  expulsion  of  the  Wahhabis 
from  the  Hijaz  in  1813,  begins  the  latest 
historical  phase  of  the  Shereefate.  The 
Protectorate  exercised  by  the  first  Khed- 


22  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

ive  of  Egypt  down  to  1840,  partly  in 
cooperation  with,  partly  in  opposition 
to,  Turkish  authority,  was  completely 
effective  and  so,  as  the  Sultan  was  regu- 
larly represented  in  the  Holy  Land  by 
a  governor  sent  from  Constantinople, 
the  good  old  tumultuous  times  did  not 
return  for  this  free  dynasty. 

The  understanding  between  the  Sher- 
eefs  and  their  protectors  at  Stamboul 
were,  however,  never  cordial;  the  aspira- 
tions and  interests  of  the  two  parties  were 
too  far  asunder  for  that.  The  Sultans 
of  Turkey  considered  the  Shereefate  as  a 
necessary  evil  that  prevented  them  from 
making  the  Hijaz  into  an  ordinary 
wilayet  or  province.  They  stationed  there 
military  and  civil  officials  similar  to  those 
in  other  wilayets,  but  the  functions  of  these 
subordinates  were  hampered  by  the  un- 
restricted power  of  the  Shereef.  After 
the  Wahhabi  war,  this  ruler  was  selected 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  23 

by  the  suzerain  and  the  rival  kinsmen 
could  no  longer  oust  an  incumbent  of  the 
hereditary  office  by  force  of  arms.  They 
were  obliged  to  resort  to  the  weapons  of 
intrigue  with  the  Sultan  and  the  Sublime 
Porte.  Still,  even  with  this  appearance 
of  stable  administration,  it  was  not  until 
1880  that  the  Shereef  finally  relinquished 
as  fruitless  all  armed  resistance  to  the 
Sultan's  deputies.  The  theory  had  been 
that  the  Sultan  was  to  be  obeyed,  but  that 
his  servants  in  the  Hijaz  were  unfaithful 
and  could  not  be  accepted.  At  Constan- 
tinople, meanwhile,  certain  members  of 
the  Shereef  s  family  were  kept  in  a  kind 
of  honourable  captivity,  partly  as  hostages 
for  the  good  faith  of  the  reigning  Shereef, 
partly  to  relieve  him  from  the  burden  of 
having  rivals  in  his  vicinity,  and  also 
it  was  a  convenience  to  have  those  rivals 
in  readiness  in  case  the  Shereef  proved 
untrustworthy. 


24  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

The  Turkish  governors  of  the  Hijaz 
had  no  easy  task.  An  energetic  Shereef 
would  always  be  on  the  alert  to  reduce 
the  governor's  authority  to  the  smallest 
measure.  A  weak  Shereef  might  be  sub- 
missive, but  then  he  was  powerless  to 
control  the  ill-disposed  elements  in  his 
family  and  make  them  innocuous,  and 
often  he  would  be  sacrificed  to  the  wiles 
of  the  opposition.  Cooperation  between 
the  two  authorities  for  the  maintenance 
of  peace  was  not  dreamed  of.  The  roads 
from  Mecca  to  Medina,  to  Jidda,  to 
Ta'if ,  were  in  a  chronic  state  of  insecur- 
ity, and  it  was  not  seldom  that  the  ra- 
pacious Bedouins  rejoiced  in  the  secret 
support  of  the  Shereef. 

The  Shereef  Aun,  incumbent  of  the 
dignity  from  1882  to  1905,  was  of  the 
energetic  type,  but  he  was,  at  the  same 
time,  an  avaricious  tyrant,  whose  actions 
suggest    Caesar's   mad    ambition.      One 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  25 

governor  after  another  had  to  yield,  and 
had  to  sit  in  his  shadow.  Ahmed  Ratab 
alone  succeeded  in  holding  on  from  1892 
to  Aim's  death  in  1905,  by  shutting  his 
eyes  to  the  Shereefs  ill  deeds  and  con- 
tenting himself  with  a  share  in  the  profits 
that  accrued  from  the  malfeasance  in 
office.  Aun's  brother,  Abdullah,  then 
living  in  Constantinople,  was  appointed 
his  successor  but  died  before  he  began  his 
journey  to  his  native  land.  Then  the 
Sultan  appointed  Shereef  AH,  a  nephew 
of  Aun,  as  "Amir  of  Mecca."  Such 
was  the  title  given  to  these  princes  by 
the  Turkish  chancery,  out  of  respect 
for  a  possible  sensitiveness  on  the  subject. 
Both  Shereef  Ali  and  the  governor, 
Ahmed  Ratib,  succumbed  when  the  great 
Turkish  Revolution  broke  out  in  1908. 
Ratib  had  to  submit  to  financial  extor- 
tions and  to  exile,  while  the  deposed 
Shereef  settled  down  in  Cairo.     His  cousin 


26  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

Husein,  son  of  Aim's  brother  Ali,  took 
his  place  as  Shereef.  It  soon  became 
apparent  that  this  Husein  intended  to 
profit  by  the  turn  of  events  to  retrieve  the 
reputation  and  status  of  the  Shereefate. 

It  is  well  known  that  Arabia  has  con- 
tributed her  share  to  the  many  difficulties 
with  which  the  Young-Turk  Government 
has  had  to  battle  from  its  inception. 
Thus  the  latter  found  it  advisable  to  let 
the  Shereef,  appointed  as  he  was  by  the 
new  regime,  to  go  his  own  gait  and  Husein 
made  ample  use  of  his  freedom. 

During  the  Turco-Italian  War,  Turkish 
occupation  was  in  a  disturbed  condition, 
especially  in  the  southern  part  of  Arabia 
and  the  Turkish  Government  asked 
Shereef  Husein  for  help  in  relieving  the 
besieged  Turkish  garrison  of  Obha  in  the 
rebellious  Asir  territory.  With  an  old- 
time  Shereef-army,  composed  of  slaves, 
mercenaries,  and  Bedouins,  Husein  un- 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  27 

dertook  a  campaign  which  did,  possi- 
bly, help  secure  the  safe  retreat  of  the 
beleaguered  Turkish  garrison  of  Obha, 
but  which  also,  undoubtedly,  tempered 
the  Shereef  s  sense  of  dependence  on 
Turkish  authority. 

The  same  National  Turkish  News 
Agency  (Milli  Agency)  contradicted  by 
Reuter  in  regard  to  the  revolt  in  Arabia, 
which  it  had  reported  as  "a  quickly 
suppressed  uprising  of  roving  robber 
bands  in  the  pay  of  England" — tele- 
graphed later  that  Shereef  Husein  was 
deposed  and  that  Shereef  Ali,  appointed  in 
his  stead,  had  already  set  out  for  Mecca. 
Here  the  natural  queries  arise  whether, 
by  the  " roving  robber  leader"  of  the 
first  Milli  report,  was  meant  Shereef 
Husein  himself,  and  whether  the  pro- 
posed journey  of  Shereef  Ali  will  pass 
without   incident.     Whether   the   newly 


28  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

appointed  Shereef,  that  is  the  man  with 
whose  aid  the  Turkish  Government  is  to 
try  to  suppress,  once  for  all,  "robber  raid- 
ing," is  the  same  who  was  replaced  by 
Husein,  some  time  ago,  is  not  made 
clear  in  the  Milli-despatch,  but  it  is  very 
probable  that  it  is.  In  that  case,  Shereef 
Ali  must  have  left  Cairo  before  the  war 
and  betaken  himself  to  Constantinople. 

Here  we  have  a  repetition  of  the  old 
game  of  playing  off  one  Shereef  against 
another,  just  as  it  was  played  in  the  past. 
And  the  outcome  will  depend  on  which 
of  the  two  can  gather  the  greater  force 
of  "robber  raiders"  under  his  standard: 
Ali,  supported  by  the  Turks  and  their 
friends,  or  Husein,  aided  by  their  op- 
ponents. 

Assuredly  either  alternative  proves  the 
significance  that  a  serious  revolt  against 
Turkish  authority  would  have  under 
present  circumstances. 


Ill 


SHEREEF  AND   CALIPH 

A  SSUMING  that  the  "robber  raiders" 
of  the  Turkish-German  despatch 
and  the  Shereef  of  Mecca,  referred  to  in 
the  Reuter  telegram  are  one  and  the 
same  person,  and  that,  accordingly,  Sher- 
eef Husein,  Emir  of  Mecca,  has  raised 
his  standard  against  the  Turkish  domina- 
tion, then  the  question  arises,  "What 
does  the  Shereef  mean  by  his  op- 
position?" 

Various  writers  on  Islam  have  com- 
mented on  the  impropriety,  according  to 
Mohammedan  law  itself,  of  the  assump- 
tion of  the  title  of  " Caliph' '  by  the 
Sultan  of  Turkey.     It  was,  indeed,  for 

more  than  nine  centuries,  regarded  by 

29 


30         The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

the  Moslem  world  as  obligatory  for  the 
Caliphs  to  be  able  to  trace  their  descent 
from  the  Arabic  line  of  Koreish,  the  line 
from  which  Mohammed  sprang.  The 
pretensions  advanced  by  the  Sultans 
since  the  sixteenth  century  have  never 
been  generally  approved.  That  they  did 
not  excite  any  vehement  open  opposi- 
tion was  partly  owing  to  the  imposing 
puissance  of  the  Turkish  Empire  at  the 
moment  when  the  Sultans  decorated 
themselves  with  the  name,  and  partly  to 
the  circumstance  that  the  usurped  dignity 
had  no  practical  sequence.  The  Caliph 
added  no  patch  of  ground  to  the  territory 
that  the  Sultan  had  conquered  with  the 
sword,  and  spiritual  authority  has  never 
been  ascribed  to  the  Caliph  by  the  Mos- 
lem congregations.  With  the  assump- 
tion of  the  highest  appellation  that  could 
be  worn  by  a  Moslem  regent  after  Mo- 
hammed, these  Sultans  simply  announced 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia         31 

to  all  Moslem  princes  that  none  of  them 
would  be  allowed  to  consider  themselves 
his  equal. 

Such  Moslems  as  were  under  Turkish 
authority  were  not  affected  by  the  Cali- 
phate of  their  Sultan.  The  relation  of 
subjects  to  their  rulers  in  Mohammedan 
realms  not  subordinated  to  Turkey  were 
even  less  affected;  and  least  of  all  did 
the  matter  signify  to  those  followers  of 
Islam  ruled  by  non-Mohammedans. 
These  are  numerous  and  have  steadily 
increased  during  the  last  centuries.  An 
effective  Caliphate,  however  explained, 
presupposes  the  political  unity  of  all  the 
faithful. 

The  Caliph  is  the  very  personification 
of  such  unity  and  is,  primarily,  the  leader 
of  Islam's  armies  against  the  foes  of  the 
Faith,  or  he  bears  a  name  bereft  of  all 
significance.  In  international  life  there 
is  no  room  for  mediaeval  structures,  and 


32  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

Turkey  can  live  in  peace  with  other 
states,  especially  with  those  possessing 
Mohammedan  subjects,  only  if  Caliphate 
pretensions  be  honestly  put  aside,  even 
though  the  title  be  maintained  as  a  formal 
one.  This  was  well  understood  by  Turk- 
ish statesmen  of  later  times,  and  they 
either  banished  the  Caliphate  idea  in  all 
their  international  discussions,  or  they 
permitted  their  European  colleagues,  who 
mistakenly  regarded  the  Caliph  as  a  sort 
of  pope — a  prince  of  the  Church — to 
continue  to  entertain  this  false  conception 
as  it  was  harmless. 

Unlettered  Mohammedans,  who,  ignor- 
ant  of  the  modern  point  of  view,  went 
on  assigning  an  important  place  to  the 
Caliphate  legend  in  their  framework  of 
the  political  system,  were,  however,  often 
presented  with  panislamic  visions  in 
order  to  retain,  fictitiously,  at  least,  what 
had  long  vanished  from  real  life.      And 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  33 

these  visions  were  often  big  with  am- 
bition. 

How  completely  at  odds  the  Caliphate 
idea  is  with  modern  international  rela- 
tions appeared  when  the  Turkish  Gov- 
ernment, seduced  by  its  alliance  with 
Germany,  brought  it  to  the  fore,  anew. 
The  first  outward  and  visible  sign  of  the 
renaissance  of  the  Caliphate  was  the 
declaration  of  the  "Holy  War,"  accom- 
panied by  an  appeal  to  all  the  Moham- 
medans in  the  world  to  participate  therein, 
irrespective  of  the  political  authority 
they  were  bound  to  obey.  Next  came  a 
series  of  official  and  officious  publica- 
tions, all  based  on  the  hypothesis  that 
the  Turkish  Sultan-Caliph  is  the  man 
who,  under  all  circumstances,  controls  the 
political  policy  of  the  Mohammedans. 

Taking  all  these  points  into  considera- 
tion, it  becomes  hardly  needful  to  reply 
to  the  question  as  to  how  the  Shereef  of 


34  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

Mecca  might,  perhaps,  try  to  become  a 
rival  of  the  Sultan  Mehmed  Reshad  as  a 
pretender  to  the  Caliphate. 

A  Caliphate,  no  matter  who  holds  the 
dignity,  is  wholly  incompatible  with  mod- 
ern political  conditions.  And  this  will 
be  as  true  after  the  present  war  as  it  was 
before.  Only  as  an  empty  title  can  it  be 
tolerated  at  all. 

For  the  rest,  it  can  be  seen,  from 
what  we  have  already  written  about  the 
history  and  the  current  condition  of  the 
Shereefate,  that  any  lofty  aspirations 
would  be  especially  ill  adapted  for  local 
principalities.  The  idea  of  a  Caliphate  of 
the  Shereefs  of  Mecca  has  been  venti- 
lated, more  than  once,  by  this  or  that 
European  writer  on  Islam,  but,  in  the 
Moslem  world,  it  has  never  been 
broached,  and  no  one  of  the  Shereefs 
from  the  House  of  Katada — rulers  in 
Mecca  and  in  varying  portions  of  West 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  35 

Arabia  ever  since  the  year  1200  A.D. — 
ever  thought  of  such  a  thing.  It  is  im- 
probable that  even  foreign  influence 
could  prevail  on  a  Shereef  of  Mecca  to 
attempt  to  gamble  for  the  Caliphate. 
They  all  know  too  well  how  little  chance 
of  success  there  would  be  in  such  an 
attempt,  and  they  feel  themselves  limited 
by  tradition  and  by  their  resources  to 
the  Hijaz. 

Perhaps  it  is  not  superfluous  to  contro- 
vert another  error  into  which  many  fall, 
— the  opinion,  namely,  that  the  wresting 
of  the  Hijaz  from  Turkish  domination 
would,  automatically,  end  the  Turkish 
Caliphate,  since  the  Caliph  bases  his 
claim  to  the  title  partly  on  his  protection 
of  the  Holy  Cities.  This  opinion  is  sup- 
ported by  neither  Mohammedan  law 
nor  by  Mohammedan  history.  Mecca 
and  Medina  have  known  periods  when, 
for  instance,  they  were  in  the  hands  of 


36  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

the  unbelieving  Karmathians,  when  again 
they  submitted  to  the  heretical  Fatimide- 
Caliphs,  when  all  relations  with  the  seat 
of  the  Caliphate  were  Suspended,  when 
the  Wahhabis  drove  the  Turks  from  the 
Holy  Land;  on  none  of  these  occasions 
did  it  occur  to  a  single  Moslem  to  ques- 
tion the  right  of  the  Caliph  to  his  dignity. 
The  Caliphate  and  the  Holy  Land  have, 
more  than  once,  existed  independently 
of  each  other. 

Quite  apart  from  high  political  aspira- 
tions, there  are  reasons  enough  which 
might  have  excited  Husein  to  renounce 
obedience  to  the  Turk.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  relations  between  Sultan-Caliph 
and  the  Shereef  have  been  perfunctory 
and  never  cordial.  The  Shereef s  have 
invariably  felt  the  protectorate  as  an 
oppressive  bond,  and  the  Turks  have 
never  been  able  to  appeal  to  the  popula- 
tion in  the  name  of  the  blessings  that 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  37 

they,  the  conquerors,  have  bestowed  on 
the  land.  They  have  given  nothing  and 
have  never  been  in  a  position  even  to 
assure  the  safety  of  the  roads  leading  to 
the  Holy  Cities  during  the  few  weeks  of 
the  pilgrimage.  In  Arabia  as  little  as 
elsewhere  have  the  Turks  tried  to  affiliate 
with  the  people.  They  are  unpopular 
in  the  highest  degree. 

The  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress, 
in  whose  hands  Turkey  has  been  since 
1908,  has  by  no  means  made  itself  idolised 
by  the  Meccanese  and  their  hereditary 
princes.  Visitors  to  Stamboul  from  Mec- 
ca, since  1908,  came  away  scandalized 
at  the  methods  and  ideals  of  Young  Tur- 
key. All  Mecca  subsists  on  the  pilgrim- 
ages, and  the  interest  of  all  is  centred  on 
the  gains  accruing  to  them  from  the 
hajji  (pilgrim) ,  just  as  that  of  an  agricul- 
tural people  is  intent  upon  the  prospects 
of   the   harvest.     The    Committee   that 


38  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

inscribed  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Frater- 
nity on  their  standards  and  then  pro- 
ceeded to  adopt  despotic  methods  in 
administration,  equivalent  to  those  of 
Abdul  Hamid,  is  regarded  at  Mecca  as 
the  cause  of  Turkey's  participation  in  the 
war  of  which  the  palpable  result  for  the 
Holy  Cities  was  the  absence  of  pilgrims 
and  the  restriction  of  the  importation 
of  foodstuffs.  Even  the  people  of  West 
Arabia,  who  had  heartily  accepted 
Turkish  sovereignty  as  such,  now  curse 
the  present  Turkish  regime.  No  wonder 
that  they  were  ready  to  appeal  to  a  power 
that  was  foe  to  Turkey's  ally,  Germany! 
The  latest  Reuter  telegram,  according 
to  which  trade  at  Jidda,  is  again  on  a 
normal  basis,  indicates  in  its  informa- 
tion one  of  the  main  causes  of  the 
Anti-Turkish  movement. 

In  the  Great  War,  the  Shereefate  of 
Mecca  cannot  possibly  take  part.     The 


The  Revolt  in  Arabia  39 

forces  at  its  disposal  are  nothing  more 
than  a  bodyguard,  a  few  mercenaries, 
and  the  contribution  made  by  some 
Bedouin  tribes,  difficult  to  hold  together, 
undisciplined,  untrained.  The  popula- 
tion of  the  holy  cities  furnishes  no  ele- 
ments for  the  formation  of  a  military 
force,  and  in  that  population,  Shereef 
Ali,  whom  the  Turks  now  wish  to  use, 
will  assuredly  find  some  adherents.  Ara- 
bia is  still,  as  it  was  of  yore,  hopelessly 
divided  by  conflicting  interests  and  by 
century-long  feuds.  It  is  not  ready  for 
great  undertakings.  But,  for  the  moment, 
a  revolt  in  West  Arabia  against  Turkey, 
under  the  lead  of  the  Great  Shereef  and 
aided  by  England,  can  cause  serious 
trouble  to  the  Turkish  Government,  and 
all  the  more,  because  it  is  at  Mecca, 
familiar  to,  and  cherished  by,  the  entire 
Mohammedan  world.  Such  a  campaign, 
well  prepared  and  ably  conducted,  would 


40  The  Revolt  in  Arabia 

be  a  master-stroke  in  opposition  to  the 
attempt,  made  by  Young  Turkey  under 
German  protection,  to  excite  the  mediaeval 
fanaticism  of  Islam  against  other  religious 
sects  and  to  use  it  as  an  incentive  to  strife. 
However  that  may  be,  those  who  abomi- 
nate playing  with  the  fire  of  religious 
hate,  a  measure  to  which  the  Young 
Turks,  in  the  main  non-religious,  have  al- 
lowed themselves,  to  be  persuaded,  have 
no  reason  to  regret  the  Arabian  uprising. 
All  that  can  tend  to  making  an  end  of 
the  unworthy  noisy  talk  of  "Caliphate" 
and  "Holy  War"  may  be  regarded  as 
commanding  respect. 


NOTE 

The  following  translation  of  the  Pro- 
clamation appeared  in  The  Near  East: 

Since  writing  his  monograph,  Professor  Hur- 
gronje  has  had  reason  to  doubt  his  surmise  as 
to  the  identity  of  the  new  Grand  Shereef  sent 
by  the  Turkish  government  to  Medina.  Prob- 
ably it  is  not  the  Ali  who  succeeded  to  his  uncle 
Aun  and  settled  in  Egypt  after  his  demission. 

The  proclamation  is  added  as  interesting  in 
connection  with  Professor  Hurgronje's  own 
articles.  He  would  have  preferred  to  give  the 
Turkish  proclamation  as  well  as  this,  had  this 
been  possible. 


41 


APPENDIX 

PROCLAMATION    OF    THE    SHEREEF    OF   MECCA 


(  ( 


In  the  name  of  God,  the  Merciful,  the 
Compassionate. ' ' 

This  is  our  general  proclamation  to  all  our 
Moslem  brothers. 

"O  God,  judge  between  us  and  our  people 
in  truth;  Thou  art  the  Judge." 

The  world  knoweth  that  the  first  of  all 
Moslem  princes  and  rulers  to  acknowledge 
the  Turkish  Government  were  the  Emirs  of 
Mecca  the  Blessed.  This  they  did  to  bind 
together  and  make  strong  the  brotherhood  of 
Islam,  for  they  saw  the  Sultans  of  the  House 
of  Osman  (may  the  dust  of  their  tombs  be 
blessed,  and  may  they  dwell  in  Paradise!), 
how  they  were  upright,  and  how  they  carried 
out  all  the  commandments  and'ordinances  of 
the  Faith  and  of  the  Prophet  (prayers  be 
upon  him!)  perfectly.  Therefore  they  were 
obedient  to  them  at  all  times. 

For  a  token  of  this,  remember  how  in  A.H. 
1322  I  with  my  Arabs  helped  them  against 

43 


44  Appendix 

the  Arabs,  to  save  Ebhah  from  those  who 
were  besieging  it,  and  to  preserve  the  name 
of  the  Government  in  honour;  and  remember 
how  again  in  the  next  year  I  helped  them 
with  my  armies,  which  I  entrusted  to  one  of 
my  sons;  for  in  truth  we  were  one  with  the 
Government  until  the  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress  rose  up,  and  strengthened 
itself,  and  laid  its  hands  on  power.  Con- 
sider how  since  then  ruin  has  overtaken  the 
State,  and  its  possessions  have  been  torn 
from  it,  and  its  place  in  the  world  has  been 
lost,  until  now  it  has  been  drawn  into  this 
last  and  most  fatal  war. 

All  this  they  have  done,  being  led  away  by 
shameful  appetites,  which  are  not  for  me  to 
set  forth,  but  which  are  public  and  a  cause 
for  sorrow  to  the  Moslems  of  the  whole 
world,  who  have  seen  this  greatest  and  most 
noble  Moslem  Power  broken  in  pieces  and 
led  down  to  ruin  and  utter  destruction.  Our 
lament  is  also  for  so  many  of  its  subjects, 
Moslems  and  others  alike,  whose  lives  have 
been  sacrificed  without  any  fault  of  their  own. 
Some  have  been  treacherously  put  to  death, 
others  cruelly  driven  from  their  homes,  as 
though  the  calamities  of  war  were  not  enough. 


Appendix  45 

Of  these  calamities  the  heaviest  share  has 
fallen  upon  the  Holy  Land.  The  poor,  and 
even  families  of  substance,  have  been  made 
to  sell  their  doors  and  windows,  yea,  even 
the  wooden  frames  of  their  houses,  for  bread, 
after  they  had  lost  their  furniture  and  all 
their  goods.  Not  even  so  was  the  lust  of  the 
Union  and  Progress  fulfilled.  They  laid 
bare  all  the  measure  of  their  wicked  design, 
and  broke  the  only  bond  that  endured  be- 
tween them  and  the  true  followers  of  Islam. 
They  departed  from  their  obedience  to  the 
precepts  of  the  Book. 

With  the  connivance  of  the  Grand  Vizier 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the  Sheikh-el- 
Islam,  the  Ulema,  the  Ministers,  and  the 
Notables,  one  of  their  papers  called  the 
Ijtihad  published  in  Constantinople  un- 
worthy things  about  the  Prophet  (The 
Prayer  and  Peace  of  God  be  upon  him!)  and 
spoke  evil  of  him  (God  forbid!).  Then  the 
Union  and  Progress  rejected  God's  word, 
"A  man  shall  have  twice  a  woman's  share," 
and  made  them  equal.  They  went  further 
and  removed  one  of  the  five  corner-stones  of 
the  Faith,  even  the  Fast  in  Ramadan,  by 
causing  the  soldiers  in  garrison  in  Mecca, 


46  Appendix 

Medina,  and  Damascus  to  break  their  fast 
for  new  and  foolish  reasons,  taking  no  account 
of  the  ordinance  of  God  saying,  "Those  of 
you  who  are  sick  or  on  a  journey.  ..." 
Yea,  they  went  further.  They  made  weak 
the  person  of  the  Sultan,  and  robbed  him  of 
his  honour,  forbidding  him  to  choose  for  him- 
self the  chief  of  his  personal  Cabinet.  Other 
like  things  did  they  to  sap  the  foundation 
of  the  Khalifate. 

For  this  it  had  been  clearly  our  part  and 
our  necessary  duty  to  separate  ourselves 
from  them  and  renounce  them  and  their 
obedience.  Yet  we  would  not  believe  their 
wickedness,  and  tried  to  think  that  they 
were  the  imaginings  of  evil-doers  to  make  a 
division  between  us  and  the  Government. 
We  bore  with  them  until  it  was  apparent  to 
all  men  that  the  rulers  of  Turkey  were  Enver 
Pasha,  Jemal  Pasha,  and  Tallaat  Bey,  who 
were  doing  whatsoever  they  pleased.  They 
made  their  guilt  manifest  when  they  wrote 
to  the  Judge  of  the  Sacred  Court  in  Mecca 
traducing  the  verses  in  the  Surah  of  the  Cow, 
and  laying  upon  him  to  reject  the  evidence 
of  believers  outside  the  Court  and  to  con- 
sider only  the  deeds  and  contracts  engrossed 


Appendix  47 

within  the  Court.  They  also  showed  their 
guilt  when  they  hanged  in  one  day  twenty- 
one  of  the  most  honourable  and  enlightened 
of  the  Moslems,  among  them  Emir  Omar  el 
Jazairi,  Emir  Arif  el  Shahabi,  Shefik  Bey 
Moayyad,  Shukri  Bey  el  Asli,  Abdel  Wahab, 
Tewfik  el  Bassat,  Abdel  Hamid  el  Zahrawi, 
Abdel  Ghani  el  Areisi,  and  their  learned  com- 
rades. To  destroy  so  many,  even  of  cattle, 
at  one  time  would  be  hard  for  men  void  of 
all  natural  affection  or  mercy.  And  if  we 
suppose  they  had  some  excuse  for  this  evil 
deed,  by  what  right  did  they  carry  away  to 
strange  countries  the  innocent  and  most 
miserable  families  of  those  ill-fated  men? 
Children,  old  men,  and  delicate  women  bereft 
of  their  natural  protectors  were  subjected 
in  exile  to  all  foul  usage  and  even  to  tortures, 
as  though  the  woes  they  had  already  suffered 
were  not  chastisement  enough.  Did  not 
God  say:  "No  punishment  shall  be  inflicted 
on  anyone  for  the  sins  of  another?  .  .  ." 
Let  us  suppose  they  found  for  themselves 
some  reason  for  ill-treating  the  harmless 
families  of  their  victims;  why  then  did  they 
rob  them  of  their  properties  and  possessions, 
which  alone  remained  to  keep  them  from 


48  Appendix 

death  by  famine?  And  if  we  suppose  that 
they  had  also  some  excuse  for  this  evil  deed, 
how  shall  we  find  pardon  for  them  for  their 
shattering  of  the  tomb  of  our  most  righteous 
and  upright  Lord  and  Brother,  El  Sayed  el 
Shereef  Abdel  Kader  el  Jezairi  el  Hassani, 
whose  bones  they  have  polluted  and  whose 
dust  they  have  scattered  abroad? 

We  leave  the  judgment  of  these  misdeeds, 
which  we  have  touched  upon  so  briefly,  to 
the  world  in  general  and  to  Moslems  in  par- 
ticular. What  stronger  proof  can  we  desire 
of  the  faithlessness  of  their  inmost  hearts  to 
the  Religion,  and  of  their  feelings  towards  the 
Arabs,  than  their  bombardment  of  that 
ancient  House,  which  God  has  chosen  for 
His  House,  saying,  "Keep  my  House  pure 
for  all  who  come  to  it," — a  House  so 
venerated  by  all  Moslems?  From  their  fort 
of  Jyad,  when  the  revolt  began,  they  shelled 
it.  The  first  shot  struck  a  yard  and  a-half 
above  the  Black  Stone.  The  second  fell 
three  yards  short  of  it,  so  that  the  flame 
leapt  up  and  took  hold  upon  the  Kiswa. 
Which,  when  they  saw,  the  thousands  and 
thousands  of  Moslems  first  raised  a  lament- 
able cry,  running  to  and  fro,  and  then  shouted 


Appendix  49 

in  fierce  anger  and  rushed  to  save  it.  They 
had  to  burst  open  the  door  and  mount  upon 
the  roof  before  they  could  quench  the  flames. 
Yet  a  third  shell  fell  upon  the  Tomb  of 
Abraham,  and  other  shells  fell  in  and  about 
the  precincts,  which  they  made  a  target  for 
their  guns,  killing  every  day  three  or  four  who 
were  at  prayer  within  the  Mosque,  till  they 
prevented  the  people  coming  near  to  worship. 
This  will  show  how  they  despised  His  House 
and  denied  it  the  honour  given  it  by  believers. 

We  leave  all  this  to  the  Moslem  world  for 
judgment. 

Yes,  we  can  leave  the  judgment  to  the  Mos- 
lem world ;  but  we  may  not  leave  our  religion 
and  our  existence  as  a  people  to  be  a  play- 
thing of  the  Unionists.  God  (Blessed  be  He !) 
has  made  open  for  us  the  attainment  of  free- 
dom and  independence,  and  has  shown  us  a 
way  of  victory  to  cut  off  the  hand  of  the  op- 
pressors, and  to  cast  out  their  garrison  from 
our  midst.  We  have  attained  independence, 
an  independence  of  the  rest  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  which  is  still  groaning  under  the 
tyranny  of  our  enemy.  Our  independence  is 
complete,  absolute,  not  to  be  laid  hands  on 
by  any  foreign  influence  or  aggression,  and 


*  « 

50  Appendix 

our  aim  is  the  preservation  of  Islam  and  the 
uplifting  of  its  standard  in  the  world.  We 
fortify  ourselves  on  the  noble  religion  which 
is  our  only  guide  and  advocate  in  the  prin- 
ciples of  administration  and  justice.  We  are 
ready  to  accept  all  things  in  harmony  with 
the  Faith  and  all  that  leads  to  the  Mountain 
of  Islam,  and  in  particular  to  uplift  the  mind 
and  the  spirit  of  all  classes  of  the  people  in 
so  far  as  we  have  strength  and  ability. 

This  is  what  we  have  done  according  to 
the  dictates  of  our  religion,  and  on  our  part 
we  trust  that  our  brethren  in  all  parts  of  the 
world  will  each  do  his  duty  also,  as  is  incum- 
bent upon  him,  that  the  bonds  of  brotherhood 
in  Islam  may  be  confirmed. 

We  beseech  the  Lord  of  Lords,  for  the 
sake  of  the  Prophet  of  Him  who  giveth  all 
things,  to  grant  us  prosperity  and  to  direct 
us  in  the  right  way  for  the  welfare  of  the 
faith  and  of  the  faithful. 

We  depend  upon  God  the  All-Powerful, 
whose  defence  is  sufficient  for  us. 

Shereef  and  Emir  of  Mecca, 

HUSEIN. 

25  Shaaban,  1334. 


** 


Jh  Selection  from  the 
Catalogue  of 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS 


Complete   Catalogues  sent 
on  application 


"UK 


Mohammedanism 

(American  Lectures  on  the  History  of 
Religions  Series) 

By 

C.  Snouck  Hurgronje 

Author  of  "  The  Holy  War  Made  in  Germany  " 
g>.  $1.50.  By  mail,  $1.65 
A  concise  account  of  the  main  prob- 
lems connected  with  the  origin,  the 
religious  and  political  growth,  and  the 
present  state  of  Mohammedanism, — es- 
pecially timely  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
the  fate  of  Mohammedanism — the  ex- 
tension or  curtailment  of  its  political 
influence — is  so  closely  involved  with 
the  outcome  of  the  war. 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


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